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Abstract: In this position paper we propose a consistent and unifying view to all 
those basic knowledge representation models that are based on the existence of 
two somehow opposite fuzzy concepts. A number of these basic models can be 
found in fuzzy logic and multi-valued logic literature. Here it is claimed that it is 
the semantic relationship between two paired concepts what determines the 
emergence of different types of neutrality, namely indeterminacy, ambivalence 
and conflict, widely used under different frameworks (possibly under different 
names). It will be shown the potential relevance of paired structures, generated 
from two paired concepts together with their associated neutrality, all of them to 
be modelled as fuzzy sets. In this way, paired structures can be viewed as a 
standard basic model from which different models arise. This unifying view 
should therefore allow a deeper analysis of the relationships between several 
existing knowledge representation formalisms, providing a basis from which 
more expressive models can be later developed. 
Keywords: Knowledge representation; Paired structures; Neutral concepts; 
Bipolarity. 
1 Introduction 
Recent advances in Psychology and Neurology are providing relevant results for the 
development of decision making models. The human brain has specifically and 
successfully evolved to manage complex, uncertain, incomplete, and even apparently 
inconsistent information. For example, neurologists have shown that the part of the 
brain taking care of making up the last decision is different to the part of the brain in 
charge of the previous rational analysis of alternatives, being the first part associated to 
emotions (see, e.g., [6],[7]). A number of similar results within neurology (see, e.g. 
  
[41],[52],[82]) suggest that the activation of different areas of the brain, associated with 
both cognition and emotion, participate in our decision processes through the 
continuous interplay among different networks (namely the valuation network, the 
control network and the memory system), each one following their own set of  rules 
(see, e.g., [59],[60]). Among other key achievements, it has been recently shown the 
key role that concept representation plays in our knowledge process (see, e.g., 
[10],[39]), along with the fact that the human brain manages positive information in a 
different way than negative information. This observation suggests some kind of 
bipolarity in the way that our brain handles information (see, e.g., [17], [18]). Positive 
and negative affects are not processed in the same region of the brain, as they are 
generated by clearly different neural processes [61]. 
The importance of bipolar reasoning in human activity was emphasized by Osgood, 
Suci and Tannenbaum in 1957 [54] (see also [38], [71]). These authors proposed a 
semantic theory based on the Semantic Differential (SD) scale for evaluating the 
meaning of concepts. This theory became very popular for measuring attitudes in a 
practical way, where individuals are asked to use the SD scale to evaluate if a given 
object is perceived as being positive, neutral or negative.  
 Nonetheless, it becomes evident that by using the SD scale, objects cannot be 
evaluated as being positive and negative at the same time, and its neutral value can 
hardly be understood as a proper representation of neutrality. From this perspective, 
there are certain attitudes that seem to escape the linear logic of such a scale, but still 
require proper representation. This led to some critiques (see, e.g., [18], [27], [38]), 
stating that the SD scale does not consider other relevant attitudes arising from the 
inherent tension among opposite-like concepts, like for example ambivalence. Hence, 
a modified SD scale was proposed (see, e.g., [38]), consisting of two unipolar scales 
joined together by their minimal element, allowing the simultaneous measurement of 
positive and negative evaluations.  
The relevance of this discussion can be well positioned and illustrated by different 
works in multicriteria decision making and decision theory (see e.g. [36], [37], [81]). 
There, the SD scale, or unipolar bivariate model [22], [36], has been widely applied, 
and further developed into more complex scales. These scales are grouped together 
under a general (somewhat oversimplifying) category of bipolar univariate models (for 
some examples on opposite-based decision modeling see again [36], but also [31], 
[78]). 
Moreover, it can be stated that our internal decision making process is of a complex 
nature, implying previous differentiated knowledge acquisition and representation 
processes (see, e.g., [48], [49]), quite often based upon multi-criteria arguments. In fact, 
the linear logic behind the SD scale does not allow representing the natural complexity 
we perceive from reality. Hence, once such a complexity is acknowledged, our 
mathematical modelling must continuously balance precision and simplicity, just as our 
brain looks for relevant but at the same time manageable information.  
But whenever an objective measure for a concept is not available, it will be difficult 
to manipulate such a concept in an isolated manner. Most surely, immediately related 
concepts need to be taken into account. Generally speaking, understanding concepts by 
means of two opposite concepts, implies that we can capture the tension between both 
opposites. In some way, such simultaneous opposite views are unavoidable to start 
  
understanding the world, and indeed we need more complex knowledge representation 
structures to manage more than two views.  
From our standpoint, most concepts cannot be properly understood in an isolated 
way. Addressing two different views seems to be the basic model to start with (although 
some concepts might need more than one surrounding concept in order to understand 
its limits). A number of quite similar fuzzy models focussing on the existence of two 
opposite concepts can be found in the literature, somehow offering a confusing view 
that we pretend to unify and explain within the unique umbrella of paired fuzzy sets and 
paired structures. We cannot understand certain concepts without understanding their 
opposite concepts. Pairs of predicates that will constitute paired concepts are, for 
example, tall/short, fat/slim, big/small, cheap/expensive or good/bad (see e.g. [63]).  
The point of departure of this paper can be found in the above considerations, 
together with the bipolar approach proposed by Dubois and Prade in several papers (see 
[22], [23], [24]). Among other things, Dubois and Prade proposed a classification of 
bipolar models in three types of bipolarity that indeed shows similarities with our 
proposal below, but also essential differences: our approach, as it will be seen, follows 
from a constructive view of what we call paired structures, by focussing on how the 
semantic tension between two opposites generates certain types of neutrality (see [62] 
for a previous attempt). In this sense we emphasize the key role of certain neutralities 
in our knowledge representation models, as pointed out by Atanassov [4], Smarandache 
[70] and others. But notice that our notion of neutrality should not be confused with the 
neutral value in a traditional sense (see [22], [23], [24], [36], [54], among others). 
Instead, we will stress the existence of different kinds of neutrality that emerge (in the 
sense of [11]) from the semantic relation between two opposite concepts (and notice 
also that we refer to a neutral category that does not entail linearity between opposites). 
Such a constructive view establishes an alternative to Dubois-Prade's approach, 
providing a distinction of those models based on opposites different from their types of 
bipolarity. Moreover, the term paired concepts we propose instead is not subject to be 
confused with the term bipolarity in the sense of a psychological disorder. 
Therefore, our alternative for modelling basic knowledge representation is based on 
paired concepts, which will naturally lead to paired structures. A paired structure is 
defined by a pair of opposite concepts plus their associated neutralities and the 
relationships between these elements. Such a basic structure stands as a primary 
foundation from where further valuation scales and learning processes can be 
developed. As a consequence, it can be understood as a first stage for more complex 
and meaningful evaluation structures, where non-neutralities are allowed besides the 
original two opposites. This paired approach has already led to a specific model for 
preference representation (see [32]), a particular case whose general framework should 
be found in this paper.  
Let us remark that this paper is not about formal logic or its interpretation. It rather 
deals with knowledge and natural language representation by means of logical tools. 
In order to illustrate our position, this paper is organized as follows: in the next 
section we shall present a general example from where our discussion will evolve. Our 
proposal will be formalized in Section 3, restricted to our definition of opposite 
concepts.  From this definition we shall formalize what we understand by paired fuzzy 
sets and paired structures. We shall expose the types of neutrality that rise from paired 
fuzzy sets, and that will produce different paired structures. Section 4 is devoted to 
  
compare our proposal with some related existing models. A discussion in Section 5 
shows a standard procedure for building paired structures, and a final Section 6 is 
devoted to discuss some open key issues for future research. 
2 Preliminary Example: On the Representation and 
Measurement of Size 
Let us try to illustrate our view through a classical well-known example. 
The meaning of the notion size of a person can be modelled in terms of predicates 
defining an evaluation scale. The structure of such a scale highly depends on how size 
is perceived, and particularly on whether it is viewed as a 1-dimensional or  multi-
dimensional characteristic. For example, in case size is understood as size = height, the 
verification of its occurrence can be evaluated within a linear scale. Let us examine 
more in detail this meaning of size = height. 
Although we all know that height is measurable in the real line, we should realize 
that we usually do not try to measure the height of each person we meet with a value in 
the real line. Instead of saying “Paula’s height looks around 1’90 meters”, most people 
will talk about Paula as a tall person, i.e., in terms of the tallness concept, which can be 
regarded as a fuzzy context-dependent concept [85]. Indeed, a person’s height is usually 
judged in terms of the predicates tall and short, which constitute semantic references 
or landmarks for the evaluation of such a notion. We hardly use the notion of a person’s 
height without the landmarks provided by the opposites tall and short, or any other 
equivalent pair of opposite predicates. 
If our concept of tallness were crisp, the sentence “Paula is tall” would have a direct 
translation on the evaluation scale in terms of height: for example, “Paula is tall” if and 
only if “Paula’s height is at least 1’70 meters”. As soon as we have this crisp definition, 
the concept of being non-tall is automatically created by the classical crisp negation: 
“Paula is non-tall” if and only if “Paula’s height is less than 1’70 meters”. That is, 
tallness is associated to the interval [1’70,∞) meanwhile non-tallness is associated to 
the interval (0,1’70). In order to generate such paired predicates (tall and non-tall), we 
simply need to assume the existence of the crisp negation: a person x within a 
community X belongs to the set of tall people if and only if the height h(x) of such a 
person is greater than or equal to 1’70. And a person x within the community X belongs 
to the set of non-tall people within X if and only if the height h(x) of such a person is 
smaller than 1’70. The set of tall people is Tall = {xϵX, h(x) ≥ 1’70}, and the set of 
non-tall people is Non-tall = {xϵX, h(x) < 1’70}. Within such a crisp context, no person 
can be tall and non-tall at the same time, and everybody will be either tall or non-tall. 
A basic paired structure to represent height has been built from only one predicate (tall) 
and its negation (non-tall), and the characteristic functions of both crisp predicates 
ߤ்௔௟௟ሺݔሻ ൌ 1	 ⟺ ݄ሺݔሻ ൒ 1′70, ߤ்௔௟௟ሺݔሻ ൌ 0	 ⟺ ݄ሺݔሻ ൏ 1′70 
are defined in such a way that  
ߤ்௔௟௟ሺݔሻ ൌ ݊ሺߤே௢௡ି௧௔௟௟ሺݔሻሻ, ∀ݔ ∈ ܺ 
ߤே௢௡ି௧௔௟௟ሺݔሻ ൌ ݊ሺߤ்௔௟௟ሺݔሻሻ, ∀ݔ ∈ ܺ 
  
being n:{0,1}→{0,1}, such that n(0) = 1 and n(1) = 0, the only negation within the crisp 
{0,1} framework (in fact, and within the crisp framework, the only one-to-one mapping 
from {0,1} into itself different from the identity mapping). These are well known facts, 
but it is important to show that tall and non-tall appear as paired predicates in a natural 
way within the crisp framework. Meanwhile a measurement of height is available and 
precise, there is no room for any kind of neutral concept. Borders between a predicate 
and its negation ({xϵX, h(x) = 1’70} in the above example) might still deserve specific 
attention, precisely because of a potential estimation uncertainty. 
However, the introduction of short as the opposite predicate of tall allows different 
translations into a measurable height, being tall and short a different couple of paired 
predicates than tall and non-tall. 
For example, and keeping the crisp approach, we can define that “Paula is short” if 
and only if “Paula’s height is at most 1’60 meters”. Again, the concept of non-short is 
automatically created, in such a way that Short = {x | xϵX, h(x) ≤ 1’60}, and the set of 
non-short people is Non-short = {x | xϵX, h(x) > 1’60}. In this way, all those people 
with height within the interval (1’60,1’70) are neither tall nor short, leading to some 
kind of indeterminacy (we cannot assign any of the only two available predicates to 
some individuals). In this particular case we know that, in order to solve this 
indeterminacy, we can create an intermediate non-neutral concept, like Medium = {x | 
xϵX, 1’60 < h(x) < 1’70}. But this is a different kind of argument, to be conducted in a 
subsequent stage. At first, what we find is just that none of the two opposite, available 
predicates apply to some individuals. In general, such indeterminacy suggests the need 
for a new predicate. Such a new predicate will not necessarily be a non-neutral 
intermediate predicate as Medium in this example, where a non-paired three-valued 
linear scale Tall-Medium-Short is easily suggested (please be aware of the specificity 
of this example, where the linear representation behind is a priori known and the two 
opposite predicates we have chosen correspond to left and right tails).  
On the other hand, we could have defined that “Paula is short” if and only if “Paula’s 
height is at most 1’80 meters”. In this case, Short = {x | xϵX, h(x) ≤ 1’80}. Then all 
those people with height within the interval [1’70,1’80] will be both tall and short, 
leading to a certain ambivalence. That is, what we find now is that both opposite 
predicates simultaneously apply. Clearly, in this specific example it is again suggested 
an intermediate concept in between opposites, like Medium = {x | xϵX, 1’70 ≤ h(x) ≤ 
1’80}, and then we could reshape opposites to avoid overlapping (for example by 
redefining Tall = {x | xϵX, h(x) > 1’80} and Short = {x | xϵX, h(x) < 1’70}). Once more, 
the construction of a linear evaluation scale (or equivalently, the interpretation of such 
ambivalence as an intermediate predicate Medium) depends on a subsequent different 
kind of argument relying on a previous interpretation of the opposites and their 
relationship. But at a first stage we can only acknowledge whether there are persons 
being both tall and short (ambivalence) or none of those predicates apply to some 
people (indeterminacy). 
Here it becomes evident the following observation, quite standard within a 
classification framework (see, e.g., [1], [2]): two opposite crisp predicates (tall/short) 
that refer to the same notion (height) can generate different neutral concepts 
(indeterminacy and ambivalence, or both), depending on their semantics. A more 
careful analysis of indeterminacy and ambivalence might suggest specific scales (see, 
e.g., [40]) by modifying the definition of the two basic opposite predicates and/or 
  
introducing new intermediate predicates. But these evaluation scales and their 
corresponding semantics can only be properly understood by firstly addressing the 
particular semantic relationship between the two basic opposites.  
A quite similar situation can be found within logic and the classical square of 
oppositions, where it is understood that a concept p comes with its negation n(p) and 
its antonym ant(p), being p and ant(p) mutually exclusive contraries (allowing 
therefore indeterminacy). In this way, n(p) and n(ant(p)) are overlapping sub-contraries  
(see [25]). But notice that, following Amo et al. [2], we should avoid a priori artificial 
conditions. In practice, such properties will be eventually reached after a sometimes 
long learning process: in our model, a concept should not be initially associated to a 
contrary, but simply to a more general opposite. Depending on the semantic relationship 
between the initial concept and its opposite, we shall be able to identify indeterminacy, 
overlapping or any other kind of neutrality. Moreover, notice that different neutralities 
can simultaneously appear (for example, the selected opposite of rather tall is naturally 
rather short, and indeterminacy arising from these two opposites should not be simply 
associated to a middle stage between extremes).   
In particular, in addition to indeterminacy and ambivalence, there is a third standard 
neutrality that can appear in more complex situations. In the above example we have 
based our arguments upon the existence of a unique, linearly-based property for 
understanding size, given by height. In practice, however, most of our concepts are 
complex in the sense that they can be explained in terms of a number of simpler 
concepts (see, e.g., [32]). In this case, our evaluation proceeds through a (perhaps non 
conscious) aggregation process. 
For example, when talking about the size of a person we can define two complex 
opposite predicates like big and small. But being big or small might depend on height 
(tall versus short) and weight (fat versus slim). Of course it may be the case that a 
person is neither big nor small, being there indeterminacy. And another person can be 
both big and small, being there ambivalence. But it can also happen that we cannot 
choose among big and small because there is a conflict behind, i.e. both opposite 
predicates hold in a conflictive manner. It is not the same to say that a person is both 
big and small because s/he is simultaneously both tall and short, or both fat and slim, 
than to say that such a person is big and small because s/he is tall but slim, or fat but 
short. The taller and fatter a person is, the bigger such a person is; the shorter and the 
slimmer a person is, the smaller such a person is. But taller and slimmer are conflictive 
arguments, like shorter and fatter are. In this more complex (multicriteria) framework 
we can find conflict as a third kind of neutrality associated to opposite complex 
predicates, in addition to indeterminacy and ambivalence. Similitude of these 
conflictive situations with incomparability within preference modelling is obvious 
since they share an underlying multicriteria view (see, e.g., [29], [30] and [78]). But 
conflict is the cognition we detect, not any specific decision making solution.   
To conclude this example, let us briefly discuss the role of points of symmetry. To 
this end, let us assume again that the meaning of size is interpreted solely in terms of 
the measurable characteristic height, and that our references are given by the predicates 
tall and not-tall. Let us now consider these as fuzzy (i.e. non-crisp) concepts. That is, 
we now allow both predicates to be evaluated on the interval [0,1] rather than on the 
binary set {0,1}. Then, for any xϵX, we may for instance set the meaning of tall and its 
complement to be represented by the fuzzy sets 
  
0                 if ( ) 1'70
( ) 1'70( )  if 1'70 ( ) 1'80 , ( ) 1 ( )
1'80 1'70
1                  if ( ) 1'80
Tall Not tall Tall
h x
h xx h x x x
h x
  
       
. 
As usually admitted, this kind of representation enables both tall and its negation 
not-tall to exhibit an imprecise semantic, avoiding the boundary problems associated 
to crisp predicates. But, apart from that, we still have just a predicate and its negation 
as opposites, fully explaining the whole universe of discourse X. No room is left for 
neutral concepts. However, contrarily to the previous crisp context, now it is possible 
for an object to be equally associated to a concept and its opposite, as now 
( ) ( ) 0.5Tall Not tallx x     can hold for a given object xϵX (i.e., whenever h(x) = 1’75 
in the current example). We refer to this situation by saying that, in a fuzzy context, a 
reference predicate and its negation admit a point of symmetry between them. It is then 
important to stress that such point of symmetry does not represent a new concept: as 
exposed above in the crisp case, there are no other available options besides the 
opposites, as both predicates are related by negation.  
In this way we can see how the tension between our two initial opposite predicates 
suggests certain neutral categories and, eventually, a particular reshaping of those 
opposite predicates (or alternatively, a non-paired structure). Non overlapping 
opposites might produce indeterminacy, overlapping opposites produce ambivalence, 
and multi-dimensional opposites might produce conflict. 
3 Semantic opposites and paired structures 
Let us study the relationships that can arise between a pair of predicates when these two 
predicates are semantically opposite, constituting the reference landmarks of a 
linguistic representation of reality. We will refer to those pairs of opposite predicates 
as paired concepts. Two paired concepts can generate neutral concepts, and meanwhile 
we consider only paired concepts together with associated neutral concepts we shall 
have a paired structure.     
3.1 Paired concepts 
Paired concepts are not simply a couple of predicates. Our first objective is to clarify 
what we mean by paired. Paired predicates must be specifically related. To begin the 
discussion about the nature of this relationship, let us remind that, as pointed out above, 
our mind is able to represent complex situations, related to interests and emotions, by 
using a pair of landmarks that constitute the references for evaluation. Such reference 
concepts allow configuring the evaluation framework in which information can be 
assessed. In other words, they constitute the referential context in which pieces of 
information are understood. As shown in our preliminary example, only if tallness can 
be known by means of a specific measure we can be confused in thinking that tallness 
can be understood without an opposite predicate like shortness. Otherwise, if such a 
  
measure has not yet been provided, even the predicate tallness requires an opposite 
predicate like shortness in order to be understood.     
We cannot understand most predicates without also knowing the meaning of all 
those other predicates that define their limits (a complex concept might need several 
additional predicates to show its limits). In this sense, two predicates have to be related 
in some specific way to effectively configure an appropriate referential context, i.e., in 
order to properly constitute a pair of reference landmarks. The previous arguments 
suggest the existence of a particular structure, in the sense of a set of objects 
(predicates) together with a set of relationships (opposition, neutrality, etc.) between 
them. 
Our point is that we should focus on the semantic opposition between paired 
predicates (see, e.g., [78]). However, such an opposition does not have a unique 
possible representation or definition, and from the different opposition relationships 
different neutral valuation concepts will emerge. For example, very tall and very short 
are opposite predicates, and more or less tall and more or less short are also opposite 
predicates, but they indeed suggest very different spaces in between them In this way, 
we will refer to negation, antonym and sub-antonym to capture the basic possibilities 
for such a semantic opposition. 
3.2 Antonym and sub-antonym with respect to a negation 
In this paper, we focus on three particular forms of such a semantic opposition between 
predicates, specifically negation, antonym and sub-antonym (see e.g. [72], [75], but also 
[64]).      
Before formalizing these three basic semantic relationships, it is important to make 
explicit that we assume that any predicate P (and thus particularly our reference 
opposites) can be represented as a fuzzy set P  over a particular universe of discourse 
X. In this way, ( ) [0,1]P x   denotes the degree up to which an object x X  verifies 
predicate P. Hence, the membership function P  is taken to represent the semantics 
(i.e. the practical meaning) of the predicate P in the context given by the universe X.  
In a first approach, we will also assume reference predicates to be simple, in the 
sense of referring to a characteristic depending on just a single criterion or dimension 
(like tall and short refer to size = height), i.e. not admitting a further decomposition in 
a set of underlying criteria or sub-predicates. As already pointed out, we can later on 
remove this assumption and analyze also complex multidimensional reference 
concepts, as could be big/small or good/bad (these concepts usually require a further 
explanation in terms of a set of underlying criteria). 
Now, let us recall that a negation function within the fuzzy context (see again [72], 
[75]) is usually understood as a non-increasing function :[0,1] [0,1]n   such that n(0) 
= 1 and n(1) = 0. All throughout this paper we are assuming that such a negation is a 
strong negation, i.e., a strictly decreasing, continuous negation being also involutive 
(i.e. such that n(n(v)) = v for all v in [0,1]). If ( )F X  denotes the set of all fuzzy sets 
(i.e. predicates) over a given universe X, then any strong negation function n determines 
a negation operator : ( ) ( )N F X F X  such that ( )( ) ( ( ))N x n x   for any predicate 
  
( )F X  and any object x X . It is therefore assured that our negation operator 
: ( ) ( )N F X F X  verifies  
A1)  N is involutive (i.e., the negation of the negation is the identity);  
A2) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )x y N y N x       for all ( )F X  and ,x y X ; 
Any operator : ( ) ( )O F X F X  verifying these two properties A1 (it is involutive 
in the sense that the opposition of the opposition is the identity) and A2 (it is 
monotonous) will be called an opposition operator. 
Let us assume now that a particular negation operator : ( ) ( )N F X F X  (or 
equivalently a particular negation function n:[0,1] → [0,1]) has been fixed. An antonym 
operator was then defined in [76] as a mapping : ( ) ( )A F X F X  verifying   
A1) A is involutive (i.e., the antonym of the antonym is the identity); 
A2) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )x y A y A x       for all ( )F X  and ,x y X ; 
A3) A N .  
In other words, an antonym is a particular opposition verifying condition A3, to be 
associated to a contrary within the nomenclature of the logical square of oppositions 
(see [25]).  
It seems therefore natural to define a sub-antonym operator (to be associated to a 
sub-contrary within the nomenclature of square of oppositions [9], [25], [51], [53]) as 
a mapping : ( ) ( )A F X F X that fulfils 
A1) A is involutive (i.e., the sub-antonym of the sub-antonym is the identity); 
A2) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )x y A y A x       for any ( )F X and ,x y X .  
A4) A N .  
Hence, N is in fact the only operator being simultaneously an antonym and a sub-
antonym with respect to N. Both antonyms and sub-antonyms are instances of 
opposition operators, and there are oppositions being neither an antonym nor a sub-
antonym. In the following we shall refer to antonym as any antonym not being the given 
negation N. Analogously, we shall refer to sub-antonym as any sub-antonym not being 
the given negation N.  
In a general sense, we consider that two predicates (or fuzzy sets) P,Q are paired if 
and only if P = O(Q), and thus also Q = O(P), holds for a certain semantic opposition 
operator O. Our point is that neutral predicates emerge from the specific relation of 
opposition holding between paired concepts. 
 
3.3 The concept of neutrality 
  
Neutral concepts are generated from two opposite predicates whenever an object cannot 
be properly explained in terms of both opposites. From a fuzzy approach, the point here 
is that the two opposites may not define a fuzzy partition of the universe of discourse, 
see [66] or any of its generalizations based upon any alternative logic (e.g. [19], but 
particularly [1], [2]). In this context, the term neutral represents an additional valuation 
concept that is being semantically generated from opposites. As suggested in [48], 
different types of neutrality or neutral concepts can emerge from the tension between 
opposites (see also [11]). 
In the above preliminary example, we started from the opposition between a concept 
and its negation, and then we considered antonym and sub-antonym concepts. In this 
way, two types of neutrality have been already introduced: indeterminacy and 
ambivalence. The first type of neutrality suggests that both opposite concepts overlap 
[14].The second type of neutrality suggests that objects cannot be fully explained solely 
in terms of the given opposites [16].  
But we were in fact assuming that there was a unique underlying simple, 1-
dimensional criterion or characteristic. In many contexts, however, opposites are rather 
complex predicates (as good/bad, beautiful/ugly or the previous big/small). These 
complex predicates show a multidimensional nature and suggest an explanation in 
terms of simpler reference predicates. This situation can be associated to a multi-criteria 
framework, in which the verification of a concept is obtained through the aggregation 
of several criteria. It is in this context where conflict can naturally appear as a third type 
of neutrality. Such conflict should be naturally expected within complex paired 
structures, whenever serious arguments for both opposites are simultaneously found in 
different, independent criteria (like when in the big/small example we find that 
someone is simultaneously very tall, suggesting a big person, but very slim, suggesting 
a small person). This situation suggests that complex opposites can show a kind of 
conflictive relation, different to the ambivalence or the overlapping associated to 
opposite concepts over a simple, 1-dimensional characteristic. In fact, this conflict 
should not be expected when dealing with paired structures on a 1-dimensional 
argument. Of course, different kinds of conflict can be acknowledged in higher 
multidimensional problems besides the above conflict between two underlying criteria. 
In summary, we should stress that different types of neutrality may appear 
depending on the semantic relationship between opposites. That is, it is the opposition 
relationship what determines the particular meaning of the different types of neutrality 
that may arise, and at the same time, of the whole paired structure. All these kinds of 
neutrality are quite often confused (sometimes even labelled under the same word) 
whenever a decision maker finds a kind of symmetrical situation that makes essentially 
difficult to choose among both opposites.  
Such hesitation is suggested for the above neutralities, but there are also non-neutral 
situations that show another kind of hesitation. For example, imprecision when 
estimating degrees of membership implies facing a different kind of uncertainty, related 
to the difficulty of choosing an exact value. Hence, even if two paired concepts cover 
reality without indeterminacy, as happens when opposition is represented through a 
given negation, uncertainty associated to estimation uncertainty may still represent a 
specific kind of hesitation. However, such hesitation due to imprecision should not be 
considered as a neutral concept, as it is not generated from the semantic tension 
between opposites.  
  
An easy approach for this imprecision problem is to associate an interval instead of 
a single value (see, e.g., [16]). The wider such an interval is, the more imprecise our 
estimation. Maximum imprecision for a membership value will be then associated to 
the complete unit interval, which would mean that we simply do not have any useful 
information about such an estimation (see [68] for a complete approach within a 
probabilistic framework, and [67] for the seminal approach within a fuzzy context). In 
general, type-2 fuzzy sets [42] can naturally appear associated to this estimation 
problem. 
3.4 Paired structures 
Paired structures belong to a first level of knowledge representation. They stand as the 
subjacent semantic structure created from two opposite predicates and their associated 
neutral concepts. With the purpose of exploring the nature of such neutrality, we should 
take particularly into account the arguments behind two main opposite-based proposals: 
Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets [4] (proved to be equivalent to interval-valued 
fuzzy sets [20],[67],[74],[79] but also [13]) and Dubois-Prade bipolarities [22],[24] (see 
next section for a comparison between our paired approach and other related models). 
Starting from a concept of interest P, a first observation is that a negation N is given 
in our model, from which it is then possible to define different antonyms or sub-
antonyms. In this sense, let us remark that P and its negation not-P contain the same 
information in our model (we should anyway remind that intuition works with 
positively defined concepts, see e.g. [21], but also [48]). In this sense, a predicate and 
its negation indeed constitute two paired predicates implying a particular empty space 
between opposites: no neutral concept can be defined in between a predicate and its 
negation, although estimation uncertainty can play a role, as already pointed out. 
Anyway, as suggested in the preliminary example, neutrality may arise in different 
manners, whenever an object fails to be fully described from the two reference 
predicates. Neutrality will in fact represent a different concept from opposites, another 
relevant available option for evaluating objects. Particularly, different paired structures 
will exhibit different types of neutrality, in such a way that its nature will sometimes be 
definitive in order to identify the particular paired structure we are dealing with. 
Although the objective of this paper is, as already pointed out, simply positional, let 
us grasp the formal model to be developed: starting from a basic predicate (and its 
negation) we can define an opposite that might imply, to some extent, the existence of 
indeterminacy (antonym) and/or ambivalence (sub-antonym), and also conflict. Hence, 
the point of departure for a general definition of a paired structure is given by a 
qualitative scale  
L={concept, opposite; indeterminacy, ambivalence, conflict}, 
composed by a pair of opposite concepts and three types of neutrality as primary 
valuations. This crisp setting corresponds to a basic model in which objects are 
evaluated by assigning exactly one concept to each object. In order to allow these 
valuations to be more general, it is then possible to introduce secondary valuations 
(referring to a secondary, ordered scale S, for instance S = [0,1]) expressing the degree 
of fulfilment of each of the predicates acting as primary valuations, consistently with 
[2] and [48]. 
  
Thus, in a first formal approach, our paired structures can be represented through a 
multidimensional fuzzy set AL given by 
 ;( ( )) |L s s LA x x x X   , 
where X is the universe of discourse and each object x X  is assigned up to a degree 
( )s x S   to each one of the above five predicates s L . This structure (X, L, S, AL) 
should be then provided with an appropriate logic (or logics, see [44],[45]), consistently 
enabling the composition of arguments. 
 
Remark 1. Notice that we have adopted the usual valuation scale of fuzzy sets, the unit 
interval [0,1], as the secondary scale S expressing degrees of verification of the primary 
predicates in L. However, as pointed out in [33], any other complete lattice would be 
as valid meanwhile it allows representing the adequate gradation needed in each 
context. In this sense, the simplest option, corresponding to the previously mentioned 
crisp, binary setting, would be to take S = {0,1}. On the other extreme, if it is needed 
to represent imprecision in the estimated degrees, then it is possible to allow intervals 
(or even general type-2 fuzzy sets) as secondary valuations, leading to S as the set of 
interval-valued fuzzy sets (or any other appropriate type-2 lattice).   
 
Remark 2. Although we do not think that just one kind of formalism is enough to 
represent all the relationships between the valuation predicates in the primary scale L, 
we indeed think that it is crucial for such a structure to be  somehow described and 
represented, i.e. specifying the valuation predicates and the relationships holding 
between them. In fact, one of our main objectives when writing this positional paper is 
to stress this structural issue. We should clarify what makes a predicate to be associated 
with its character besides its name. As we will be discussing in the next section, many 
of the existing extensions of fuzzy sets fail to describe any underlying structure, and as 
a consequence, it is usually difficult to appreciate what are the actual differences and 
similarities between those extensions. For instance, and following [48], the 
relationships between our primary predicates in L can be explained in terms of a 
digraph, where neutrality with respect to our two opposites must be structurally 
acknowledged as neutral. But in some contexts these relationships might be better 
expressed through constraints relating the different degrees ( ),s x s L  , so they reflect 
their intended meaning. In this sense, notice that, following [1] and [2], we are not in 




 , which for each x X would define a convex 
polyhedron in [0,1]L . Specific constraints like this one might be appropriate depending 
on the chosen logical connectives (see [55],[65],[80]). Of course, other generalizations 
of fuzzy sets may also be considered for the representation of predicates (see, e.g., [11]). 
4 A comparison with some other opposite-based models 
  
In 1965 Zadeh introduced the notion of fuzzy set [85]. Since it appeared, it was clear 
that there was a problem for building the membership degree of each element in the 
considered set. For this reason, in 1971 he proposed the first idea of an extension, called 
type-2 fuzzy set (see [42],[86]). In this extension, the membership degree of each 
element is given by a fuzzy set of the valuation scale [0,1]. Furthermore, the problem 
of constructing the membership degrees has led to the introduction of different 
extensions, of which we highlight interval-valued fuzzy sets (also known as grey sets, 
and equivalent to vague sets), fuzzy multisets and n-dimensional fuzzy sets, 
neutrosophic sets, hesitant fuzzy sets, meta-fuzzy sets, etc. (see, e.g., [12]). There exist 
also other types of extensions (see, e.g., [13]), as probabilistic sets, fuzzy rough sets or 
fuzzy soft sets, which have a different origin from that of the previous ones, since they 
were not introduced to solve the problem of defining the membership degree of the 
elements. This large sequence of names and models has indeed produced certain 
confusion. In fact, some of those models were later found to be equivalent to existing 
ones, and in some cases the intuitive justification behind such models does not fully fit 
the mathematical model itself (some denominations happen to be equivalent only when 
certain structural issues are not taken into account, as pointed out in [48]). Some light 
should be brought to this problem if we address how the most basic knowledge 
representation models are generated from two opposite concepts. Hence, let us then 
comment the relationship between our paired approach and some of the main opposite-
based models: interval valued fuzzy sets, shadowed sets, Atanassov’s intuitionistic 
fuzzy sets, bipolar fuzzy sets, and neutrosophic fuzzy sets 
Among all those opposite-based fuzzy models, Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets 
(A-IFS) deserve a particular analysis (see [21] for a complete analysis). According to 
Atanassov [4], an A-IFS assigns to each object both a degree of verification to certain 
property and a degree of verification to the negation of such a property, in such a way 
that these two degrees of verification sum at most 1. In this way, a principle which is 
demanded in classical logic can be recovered: the Lukasiewicz conjunction of the 
degree of verification of a property and the degree of verification of the negation of that 
property is always 0, and thus the non-contradiction law holds.  
Moreover, Atanassov introduced the hesitancy or indeterminacy index as 1 minus 
the sum of the degrees of verification of the property and its negation. This index 
intends to represent the difficulty in the problem of building the exact membership and 
non-membership functions. Hence, a fuzzy partition in the sense of Ruspini [66] is 
being defined in terms of the given property, its negation and the remaining hesitancy.  
First of all, it has been criticized that the entitlement “intuitionistic” looks 
inappropriate despite many scientists have accepted such a denomination (see the 
alternative intuitionistic fuzzy model proposed in [73]). Moreover, measuring the 
degree of verification of the negation of a property seems difficult to achieve in practice 
(for example, within a Probability framework we rarely ask for the probability of the 
negation of an event: we usually evaluate the probability of the event and then we 
reckon the probability of its negation… Otherwise most probably the values we provide 
for the event and its negation will not sum up to 1).  
In addition, what the remaining category of “indeterminacy” means is not clear 
along Atanassov’s texts. Anyway, as already pointed out, from a purely mathematical 
view A-IFS are equivalent to interval-valued fuzzy sets (IVFS), in such a way that the 
length of each interval is the same as the hesitancy index defined by Atanassov. 
  
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out in [48] that the structural issue is missing in both 
models. By explicitly stating the different predicates that intervene as well as the 
relationship between them, both models can be distinguished in the framework of 
paired structures (and particularly in that of meta-fuzzy sets, see [48]). Without 
addressing the structural issue, both Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets and interval-
valued fuzzy sets are simply defining a Ruspini´s partitions [66] of three classes, no 
matter the different names we assign to each of the three categories in each model.  
Beside Atanassov’s argumentation, in our opinion the key element in his model is 
that he puts together several fuzzy sets, stressing in this way that we cannot evaluate 
each fuzzy set in an isolated way. A similar claim can be found in specific frameworks, 
see e.g. [46], where in order to escape from Arrow’s paradox [3] different types of 
intensity preferences (strict preferences, weak preferences, indifferences, and 
potentially incomparability) were simultaneously amalgamated into structured 
Ruspini’s partitions [66]. Ruspini’s partition was generalized in [2] by suppressing any 
restriction on the degrees of membership, producing what Miyamoto [43] calls multiset 
(see also [83]). But notice that classes in [2] were expected to evolve in terms of non-
overlapping, covering and relevance (see [1]), consistently with our paired approach. 
In this sense it is interesting to point out that n-dimensional fuzzy sets [69] are multisets 
implying the existence of a linear structure for the n classes under consideration. 
On the other hand, the concept of bipolarity in a fuzzy framework was initially 
proposed by Zhang and Zhang (see [87], [88]), assigning two independent valuations 
to each object. As already pointed out above, the term bipolarity comes from 
Psychology where it has a specific meanings that might not properly fit neither into this 
proposal nor into the three types of bipolarity considered by Dubois and Prade (see 
again [22],[23],[24]). Zhang and Zhang assumed that one of the two opposites is 
assigned a value on the  unit interval [0,1], while the other one ranges in the opposite 
interval [-1,0]. Hence, since both intervals are isomorphic, and no matter the terms used 
to intuitively justify these two values, the fact is that Zhang-Zhang’s bipolar model 
appears as a specific multiset (n=2), with no restriction on their two degrees of 
membership. Zhang-Zhang’s bipolar model is therefore equivalent to the neutrosophic 
sets proposed by Smarandache [70]. Notice also that none of these two equivalent 
models include any formal structure, as claimed in [48]. But the selected denominations 
within each model might suggest different underlying structures: while the model 
proposed by Zhang and Zhang suggests conflict between categories (a specific type of 
neutrality different from Atanassov’s indeterminacy), Smarandache suggests a general 
neutrality that should perhaps jointly cover some of the specific types of neutrality 
considered in our paired approach.   
Shadowed sets [57] are a particular case of interval-valued fuzzy sets, being 
isomorphic with a three valued logic: each object is assigned a “0” if certain property 
does not hold, “1” if it does hold, and the unit interval [0,1] otherwise. Anyway, it might 
be unclear the meaning of the selected term for this third stage: “complete ignorance” 
might refer to an extremely poor estimation or to extremely poor knowledge about the 
model itself, for example. 
All in all, the above discussion suggests that there is an urgent need to put some 
unifying light on the similarities and differences of all the mentioned extensions of 
fuzzy sets in terms of their representational structures and capabilities. This is precisely 
the idea we wish to communicate through this positional paper on paired structures: the 
  
need for a unifying framework in which the different models arise as a consequence of 
the specified structure (on the primary predicates) and the different secondary scales. 
Such a unifying view should then allow a deeper analysis of the relationships between 
several knowledge representation formalisms, providing a basis from which more 
expressive models may be later developed. 
Summing up, the structural issue is required for a proper specification of meaning 
in a logical-mathematical modelling. If structural issues are not properly addressed in 
our mathematical models, we might be easily confused between different approaches 
once they appear as isomorphic, simply because the difference in structure is not taken 
into account. This was the main issue raised in [48], in this paper focussed into 
opposite-based models. Our mathematical models should capture all the essential 
aspects of reality, including the relations between modelled predicates. Listing 
elements should be accompanied with the relations between the elements of that list. It 
is the structural difference what justifies a denomination, not the other way around. 
Structural performance of a set of concepts does not come with a list of unrelated 
objects or names. If these elements suggest a structure, such structure should be 
formally stated. 
5 Building Paired Structures 
In our opinion, the most basic structure to represent knowledge should at least contain 
a predicate and its opposite, particularly in terms of negation, antonym or sub-antonym. 
In this way we can distinguish an arbitrary couple of concepts from two paired 
predicates, and the associated neutral concepts naturally appear from the characteristics 
of such an opposition. On this basis, we can propose a basic approach to a standard 
procedure for building paired structures: 
1) We always start from a concept and its negation (a must in our model, since antonym 
or sub-antonym are relative to the given negation). 
2) Then, any two opposite predicates are paired concepts and, if different from such a 
negation, their semantic relation will generate additional and specific neutral concepts. 
In case our original predicate and its opposite do not overlap, indeterminacy arises (our 
paired predicates do not fully explain reality, and they can be reshaped into wider 
concepts or they can suggest a search for additional information, producing perhaps a 
new intermediate non-neutral concept). In case our seminal predicate and its opposite 
overlap, ambivalence arises (the existence of a new concept associated to such 
overlapping is suggested together with a reshaping of opposites into more precise 
concepts). Of course indeterminacy and ambivalence can appear simultaneously, 
whenever the opposition is neither antonym nor sub-antonym (overlapping in some 
objects might suggest ambivalence, and lack of fulfilment in some other objects might 
suggest indeterminacy).  
3) Whenever we detect conflict, it entails that the considered paired concepts are 
viewed in our mind as complex concepts that should be decomposed into and 
aggregated from simpler concepts. In addition, each one of those simpler concepts is 
subject to the previous arguments (the concept, its negation, its antonym or its sub-
antonym, etc.) 
  
Hence, three main families of paired fuzzy sets appear in this paper:  
- Those “basic” paired concepts based upon the negation of both predicates, 
with no additional neutral concept being allowed. 
- Those “simple” paired concepts based upon opposites (antonym or sub-
antonym associated to indeterminacy or ambivalence neutralities, and perhaps 
both simultaneously). 
- And those “complex” paired concepts based upon multidimensionality, where 
in addition to indeterminacy and ambivalence we can find different levels of 
conflict. 
These three families of paired fuzzy sets are close to the three types of bipolarities 
proposed by Dubois and Prade in [22],[23],[24]. But rather than focusing on the 
formalization of scales that address some representational issues when dealing with 
poles, our focus is on the configuration of such poles through opposition relationships, 
and how these determine the scales to be used regarding the representational power of 
the models.  
6 Final Comments 
In this paper we have presented a systematic approach to different types of paired sets, 
to be considered as an alternative to the notion of bipolarity proposed by Zhang and 
Zhang ([87], [88]), Dubois and Prade ([22], [23], [24]) and other proposals somehow 
based upon two basic opposite concepts (but taking into account the structural 
arguments of [48]). All of these models are deeply related to Atanassov’s intuitionistic 
fuzzy sets (see [4], [5]).  
The main aim of this paper is to bring some light into this discussion, bolding the 
constructive argument towards a unifying view and stressing the role of different 
neutralities in between two opposite concepts. In particular, we postulate that paired 
structures represent a basic model for most learning processes, which quite often start 
from two opposite predicates (see [28], [47]). Relation between these two predicates 
can create specific neutral concepts: indeterminacy (which can be justified in terms of 
too narrow concepts), ambivalence (which can be justified in terms of too wide 
opposites), and conflict (which can be justified in terms of multidimensional opposites). 
But it is the specific semantic tension between two basic opposites the key aspect to be 
analysed. Of course the three different neutralities we have considered in this paper can 
appear in the same problem, together with other uncertainties (particularly, 
imprecision). How we can simultaneously manage all these parameters becomes a 
suggesting and necessary objective for future research.  
In order to stress its unifying view on a number of models that are based upon the 
existence of two opposites, a full mathematical development of our paired structures 
have been left outside this positional paper. A first application of our paired approach 
has been presented in [32]. Another interesting field to consider next should be 
Sentiment Analysis, where indeed two opposite meanings (positive, negative) are 
associated to terms within a text that can be classified according our approach (see, e.g., 
  
[56]). Also, as already pointed out, main issues to be addressed in future research on 
paired structures concern the study of different formalisms to represent the relationships 
between the elements of the structure (e.g. sets of logical constraints on the degrees of 
the qualitative predicates, digraphs, partial orders, etc.) and their effect in relation with 
the representational power of the associated structures.   
A possible drawback of the general case of paired fuzzy structures is that they can 
be considered too complex for some applications, since it might imply the direct 
estimation of quite a number of degrees of verification for each object (in particular 
when our concepts have a multicriteria nature and all neutralities are present). 
Moreover, our structure has to be completed addressing imprecision. In order to manage 
this complexity, another main issue for future research on paired structures should be 
to explore other extensions of fuzzy sets (see, e.g., [15]). An alternative approach is to 
obtain some degrees of membership or membership functions from a smaller subset of 
categories, in such a way that the whole system can be fully described from a few 
parameters to be estimated. To some extent, this is similar to what is sometimes done 
in preference modelling, where three neutralities are naturally learnt: the preferences 
between two alternatives may (they are perhaps weak preferences, leading to the 
ambivalent indifference), or they are perhaps very extreme strict preferences (leading 
to indeterminacy); or they can even reflect some multicriteria-based conflict 
(sometimes solved in terms of incomparability, see e.g. [30], [31], [50] and particularly 
[46]). Similar models are found concerning different extensions of Belnap’s logic [8], 
like that proposed in [77] (see also [55], [58] and [65], [80]). The study of appropriate 
logic connectives will play a crucial role in constructing and constraining the semantics 
of the different predicates generated from the two reference opposites (see also [26]). 
In this sense, aggregation operators play a crucial role in all these models, and they 
should play a similar role in relation to complex paired structures in which 
multidimensional concepts are decomposed into (and obtained from) simpler concepts. 
Moreover, as suggested in introduction, another interesting objective for future research 
is to extend this model into those multiple concepts that cannot be understood with a 
unique opposite concepts, but they need several concepts to capture its limits. 
All in all, the main objective of this paper is to stress the need for a unifying 
framework that should allow a better understanding of different models in terms of 
different specifications of a basic, quite general structure. Such a unifying view should 
then allow a clarifying analysis of the relationships between several knowledge 
representation formalisms. A basis for the development of more expressive models 
should be also provided. 
In particular, paired structures stand as a first attempt to describe reality through the 
logical representation of context and the paired aggregation of semantically opposite-
related concepts. As a point of departure for knowledge representation, paired 
structures allow building the meaning of concepts by logical analysis, learning their 
semantic structure. The semantical relationship between paired concepts can suggest 
new concepts or their own reshaping. Paired fuzzy sets and paired structures should be 
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